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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE OF IDAHO 
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID A. DOUGLAS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
TERRY KERR; and BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; and Does 1-10 as individuals with an interest 
in the property legally described as: 
Lot 39, Block 6, Woodbridge at Ivan's Acres Division No. 1, to the City ofldaho Falls, 
Bonneville County, Idaho, according to the official plat recorded September 17, 2001, as 
instrument no. 1057898. 
Which may commonly be known as: 2895 Woodbridge Circle, Idaho Falls, ID 83401, 
Defendants. 
RESPONDENT NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC'S OPENING BRIEF 
Case Number 43540-2015 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County. 
Appeal from the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 
David Douglas 
580 Aswan Street 
Sparks, NV 89441 
Appellant-Pro-Se 
Lewis N. Stoddard, ISB #7766 
RCO Legal, P.C .. 
300 Main Street, Suite 150 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Respondent Nationstar Mortgage LLC 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant's listed issues on appeal are rephrased as follows: 
I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent where the undisputed facts showed that it was the beneficiary under a Note and Deed 
of Trust secured by the property commonly known as 2895 Woodbridge Circle, Idaho Falls, ID 
83401, the obligations under which were in default. 
II. Whether the district court property denied Appellant's claim of exemption. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether respondent is entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is an appeal challenging the judicial foreclosure 1 of property commonly known as 
2895 Woodbridge Circle, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (the "Property"). The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Respondent on the grounds that it was entitled to enforce the Note 
and Deed of Trust and to foreclose because of a default in the payment obligations. Appellant 
failed to file any opposition and what he did file failed to present any evidence to create an issue 
of material fact. Specifically, Appellant failed to contest the default or the terms of the Note and 
Deed of Trust. Accordingly, the district court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor 
of the Respondent. Final Judgment was entered on September 17, 2015. This appeal followed. 
1 LC.§ 6-101. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On January 14, 2015, Respondent filed the present action to judicially foreclose on the 
Property and to have the interests of the named defendants declared subordinate and subject to 
Respondent's Deed of Trust. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R. _") at 2 and 8-32.) In response, on 
February 13, 2015 and February 27, 2015, Defendant Terry Kerr2 and the Appellant, each 
respectively filed separate pro-se Answers generally denying all the allegations contained within 
the Complaint. (R. at 33-37.) On February 27, 2015, Appellant also filed a document entitled 
"Defendant's Notice of Removal to United States District Court." (R. at 2.)3 
Thereafter, on April 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum in Support, Affidavit of Nationstar Mortgage LLC in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Notice of Hearing setting the motion to be heard on May 19, 2015. (R. 
at 2; R.Adden 020-034.) On April 28, 2015, Defendant Terry Kerr filed an Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.Adden 035-053), as well as a Memorandum in Support of the 
Defendants Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.Adden 054-059.) 
2 Though the present appeal is only being pursued on behalf of Appellant David Douglas, it bears an uncanny 
resemblance both in substance and form to two previous appeals filed by Defendant Terry Kerr. The first is entitled 
Terry Lee Kerr v. Bank of America, Idaho, NA., 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 719 (Ct. App. 2011). The second is 
entitled Terry Lee Kerr v. ReconTrust Co., et. al., 2014 Unpublished Opinio, No. 829 (Ct. App. 2014) . 
. 
3 Beyond filing the referenced notice, Appellant took no further action tor .nove the present matter to federal court. 
Appellant did not file a Petition for Removal with the Federal Court attaching the required documents and did not pay 
an appropriate fee for removal. Rather, it appears that Appellant believed that because he had filed a separate 
lawsuit, he could just file a notice of removal in State Court and it would be unilaterally removed and combined with 
his separate federal lawsuit. 
The district court correctly noted that without some evidence that Appellant properly removed the case to federal 
court, it retained jurisdiction over the matter and was free to proceed with ruling on the Respondent's summary 
judgment motion. (R.Adden 112.) 
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Defendant Terry Kerr also filed his own affidavit support. (R.Adden 099.) Appellant did not 
file any type of responsive memorandum nor did joinder in Defendant Kerr's opposition materials 
or sign the materials. Instead, on April 28, 2015, Appellant filed a Declaration in support of 
Defendant Kerr's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (R.Adden 060-064.) 
On May 7, 2015, Defendant Terry Kerr filed a Motion to vacate the summary judgment 
hearing and motion for an order of recusal of the presiding Judge Joel Tingey. (R. at 3.) On May 
15, 2015, Defendant Terry Kerr filed his Notice of Second Idaho Judicial Council Complaint 
Filed Against Judge Tingey. (R. at 3.) On May 11, 2015, Respondent filed its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Adden 100-104.) On May 18, 
2016, Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion to Vacate and to the Motion for an Order of 
Recusal; however, that same day, Judge Tingey disqualified himself. (R. at. 3.) 
Due to the self-disqualification, Respondent's summary judgment hearing was vacated 
while the case was reassigned. The matter was then assigned to the Honorable Judge Bruce 
Pickett, who disqualified himself and on May 20, 2015, the matter was again reassigned to the 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson. (R. at 3.) Following Judge Simpson's assignment to this matter, 
Respondent rescheduled its summary judgment hearing for June 17, 2015, following which 
Defendant Terry Kerr moved to vacate the hearing and requested a new hearing. (R. at 3.) Kerr's 
requests were denied and on June 17, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment after which it took the matter under advisement. (R. at 3-4.) 
On August 17, 2015, the Honorable Judge Darren B. Simpson issued an Order Granting 
,., 
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Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.4 (R.Adden 105-115.) on September 19, 
2015, the court entered an Order for Sale of Foreclosure, Order and Decree of Foreclosure, 
Judgment, and Order for Default as against Defendant Bank of America, N.A. for non-
appearance. (R. at 40-53.) 
On August 27, 2015, following the entry of the Order granting summary judgment but 
before the entry of final judgment, Appellant filed a deficient Notice of Appeal, which he later 
amended on October 14, 2015. (R. at 54-83.) 
Since the entry of Judgment, there have been a number of additional motions filed by the 
Defendant Terry Kerr and the Respondent in this matter including multiple attempts to improperly 
claim the Property as exempt and to claim a homestead exemption, as well as requests to stay the 
foreclosure pending the present appeal. (R. at 6-7.) All of the motions were denied and the 
Property was sold at a Sheriff's Sale on February 25, 2016. 
Statement of Facts 
In granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff the District Court correctly noted 
the following undisputed facts: 
1. On January 3, 2006, Douglas borrowed $273,000 from GreenPoint 
Mortgage Funding, Inc. (hereinafter "GreenPoint") and signed the Note. 
2. Under the Note, Douglas promised to make monthly payments, beginning 
March 1, 2006 until the Note was paid in full. Douglas also agreed that 
GreenPoint might transfer the Note. 
4 Though Judge Simpson's written order bears the correct case number, county and court, for unknowii reasons it was 
never filed in Bonneville County and thus does not appear within the Repository. The Order was received by all of 
the parties and thus the Court and the Parties all acted in accordance with the Order, not recognizing that the clerk of 
Bonneville county had not entered the Order into the docket on this matter until the present appeal began. (See 
R.Adden 105-115; compare to R. 2-7.) 
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3. On January 5, 2006, to secure repayment of the Note, Douglas signed the 
Trust Deed whereby he granted and conveyed legal title to GreenPoint's trustee 
the following real property: Lot 39, Block 6, Woodbridge at Ivan's Acres, 
Division No. 1, to the City ofidaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho, according to 
the Official Plat recorded September 17, 2001 as Instrument No. 1057898 
(hereinafter the "Property"). 
4. According to Nationstar's verified Complaint, on or about July 2, 2012, 
Douglas executed a quit claim deed purporting to transfer all of his interest in the 
Property to Kerr. 
5. The original beneficiary of the Trust Deed was MERS or its successors or 
assigns. 
6. According to its verified Complaint, Nationstar became the holder of the 
Trust Deed. As such, N ationstar has the right, under the Trust Deed, to foreclose 
on the Property if Douglas fails to perform his covenants and agreements under 
the Note and the Trust Deed. 
7. According to Kerr, Kerr owns the Property "with" Douglas, "with the 
mortgage to Nationstar." 
8. Douglas breached his agreement under the Trust Deed by failing to make 
payments due under the Note. Douglas did not make his March 1, 2011 payment 
on the Note, and has made no payments since that date. 
(See R.Adden 106-108.) 
Additionally, to avoid any confusion in this matter where Appellant's opening brief argues 
claims and issues not otherwise pled in the present suit, it is worth providing some additional 
background. Specifically, Appellant is combining and confusing issues and claims associated 
with separate lawsuits filed by both himself and Defendant Kerr. For instance, shortly after the 
present action was filed, Appellant filed a separate lawsuit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho, Case No. 4:15-cv-00055-ELJ-REB, entitled David Douglas v. Zions Bank 
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NA. and Nationstar Mortgage LLC, on February 20, 2015. In his federal complaint, Appellant 
complained of "illegal practices" by Zions and Nationstar related to underlying loans and/or loan 
modifications and he asserted no less than eight separate claims for violation of state and federal 
law including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference, violation of TILA, violation of the 
Bank Holding Company Act, and racketeering. 5 (See R. at 69-81.) All of Appellant's claims 
asserted were dismissed by the Honorable Ronald E. Bush in a written Report and 
Recommendation dated February 15, 2016. (See Dkt. No. 34.) On March 16, 2016, the 
Honorable Edward J. Lodge then issued a written Order adopting the Report and 
Recommendation and on Marcy 7, 2016, final Judgment was entered. (See Dkt. Nos. 35 and 36.) 
No appeal has been filed. 
Similarly, during the pendency of this case, Defendant Kerr also filed a separate lawsuit in 
the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, entitled 
Terry Kerr v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC et. al., Case No. CV 15-2429. In that suit, Kerr asserted 
nearly identical claims to Appellant's federal case including claims for breach of contract, breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference, unjust enrichment, breach 
of fiduciary duty, racketeering, violation of RICO, and violation of TILA. The Idaho Supreme 
Court Data Repository shows that Mr. Kerr attempted to move for default, which was denied at 
5 Through issue nos. 2-4 of Appellant's opening brief, he appears to be challenging the dismissal of claims that he 
asserted as part of his federal suit but never asserted as part of the present state court litigation either in the form of a 
counterclaim, defense, or affirmative defense, which are not properly before this Court. 
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the same time that summary judgment was granted and his claims were dismissed. 6 Judgment 
was entered on September 22, 2015 and Mr. Kerr made no timely appeal. 7 
ARGUMENT 
Throughout these proceedings, Appellant has continually set forth baseless accusations 
and inflammatory conspiracy theories covenng everything from bribery, racism, forgery, 
conspiracy, etc. The present appeal is of no exception. Specifically, on appeal Appellant has 
identified a total of 11 issues, which can be broken down into three general categories: 1.) 
Appellant asserts issues which are related to the present suit for judicial foreclosure; 2) Appellant 
asserts issues which are related to separate lawsuits filed by both himself as well as Defendant 
Kerr, neither of which have been timely appealed and are not properly before the court; and 3) 
Appellant asserts various conspiracy theories which are unsupported and without merit. (See 
Opening Brief on Appeal, pgs. 1-4.) Ultimately, all of Appellant's claimed issues are meritless. 
First and foremost, Appellant fails to support his issues on appeal with relevant argument, 
authority, or coherent thought such that they are too indefinite to be heard by this Court. In fact, 
Appellant's opening brief contains NO citations to the appellate record which purportedly support 
his issues on appeal and there is not a single piece of legal authority cited by the Appellant that 
demonstrates that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the 
6 Through issue Nos. 7-9 of Appellant's Opening Brief, Appellant is clearly trying to challenging the district court's 
rulings in a completely separate case which are not properly before the court and which Appellant lacks standing to 
raise as he was not a party to the subject suit. 
7 These cases are only being mentioned because many of the issues identified in Appellant's opening brief have 
nothing to do with the present lawsuit, but instead show that Appellant is trying to improperly use the present appeal 
to seek review of adverse rulings and judgments entered in separate lawsuits which have not been appealed. 
Specifically, issues nos. 2-4, and 7-9 all stem from the separate actions identified above. 
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Respondent. 
Second, Appellant confuses the present case with other simultaneous lawsuits that he and 
Defendant Kerr filed which were dismissed and have not been appealed. And claims asserted in 
those separate suits are not properly before this Court on appeal. 
Lastly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondent 
and denied Appellant's claims of exemption where the undisputed evidence showed that the 
Property was secured by a Deed of Trust, the obligations under which were in severe default. 
Appellant came forth with no evidence contesting the default. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's rulings. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
below: 
Appellant fails to set forth the applicable standard of review. Accordingly it is set forth 
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same 
standard as the district court." Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of 
Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 182, 335 P.3d 25, 27 (2014). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Kepler-Fleenor 
v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207, 210, 268 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2012). When "the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law 
remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Stonebrook Const., LLC v. 
Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 930, 277 P.3d 374, 377 (2012) (quoting 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 
641, 644 (2006)). 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., v. Ralph E. Sheets, Jr., et. al., __ Idaho __ , __ P .3d _, 
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6 WL 1638202 (2016). 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED ALL ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL. 
On appeal, Appellant raises a myriad of issues, some of which relate to the present lawsuit 
and many of which relate to other lawsuits; however, the Court need not even bother with 
determining which of Appellant's issues on appeal relate to the present lawsuit and which do not 
since Appellant fails to set forth any legal or factual argument to support their contentions. 
Appellant's failure to support his issues on appeal results in waiver. 
This Court has previously stated as follows: 
pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those litigants 
represented by an attorney. See, e.g. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 39611, 2013 
WL 2232287 at *10 (May 22, 2013). Thus, this Court has refused to consider an 
appellant's claims "because he has failed to support them with either relevant 
argument and authority or coherent thought." Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 
234 P .3d 696, 698 (2010). "Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of 
error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 
96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal 
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 
263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the record on appeal for 
error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof'l Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 
(2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and 
supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 
141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Clark v. Cry Baby Foods, LLC, et. al., 155 Idaho 182 (2013); Citing to Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 
784, 790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-53 (2010). The Idaho Appellate Rules specifically require an 
appellant to support his contentions "with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and record relied upon." Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 
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2012); quoting I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Thus, "even where an issue is 'explicitly set forth in the party's 
brief" as one of the bases for appeal, if it is' only mentioned in passing and not supported by any 
cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." Id.; citing to Dawson v. 
Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010) (citing lnama v. 
Boise Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450,456 (2003)). 
Here, appellant has waived the right to appeal the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment and the resulting orders authorizing the judicial foreclosure of the Property as 
well as the district court's denial of his claim(s) of exemption because he cites no authority, 
statutes, parts of the transcript or the record that he is relying upon to support his contention that 
the rulings were in error. Rather, Appellant merely expresses his disagreement with the various 
rulings and continues to set forth unfounded conspiracy theories which have no bearing on 
present appeal. 
For example, in his opening brief on appeal Appellant confuses this suit with other suits 
that were filed and the meritless claims asserted in each, claiming to have established claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 8 civil conspiracy, 9 racketeering, 10 judicial 
manipulation, 11 breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing12 which 
were never pied in the present action either in the Complaint (See R. at 8-32), through the Answer 
8 Appellant's Opening Brief, pg. 2, Statement oflssues, Sec. 2; see also Statement of the Case, Sec. 13. 
9 Id., Statement ofissues, Sec. 3. 
10 Id .. , Statement ofissues, Sec. 4. 
11 Id., Statement ofissues, Sec. 9; Id., Statement of the Case, Sec. 11-12. 
12 Id., Statement of the Case, Sec. 14. 
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of Defendant Kerr (R. at 33-35), or through Appellant's ovm (R. at 36-37.). And as 
this court has noted, "[t] he only issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the 
pleadings," and that if a party facing a motion for summary judgment decides it has alleged the 
wrong claim for relief or wants to raise another it must amend its COII?.plaint. Mickelsen Constr., 
Inc. v. Horrocks, 299 P.3d 203 (2013); citing to Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 148 
Idaho 157, 160 (2009); see also Vanvooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 443 (2005); Gardner v. 
Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 939, 719 P.2d 1185, 1199 (1986)(declining to address a new claim for 
defamation as it had not been raised in the pleadings and thus there was a failure to give adequate 
notice of the claim.) 13 
At the end of the day, while appellant may disagree with the court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent, he has failed to point to any factual or legal error with the 
district court's decision. Rather, Appellant is clearly using the present appeal as further 
opportunity to espouse conspiracy theories and baseless claims. Because Appellant's arguments 
are not supported with authority, citations to the record, relevant argument or coherent thought, 
the issues are waived and this Court should decline to consider them. 
Accordingly, the district court's decision granting summary judgment m favor of 
Respondent should be affirmed in all respects. 
13 Federal jurisprudence is in accord. See Rodriguez v. Countrywide Homes, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1239, *1245, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 105433, **14 (E.D. Cal. 2013)(noting that a plaintiff cannot oppose summary judgment based upon a 
new theory of liability because it would essentially blind side the defendant); citing to Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 
232 F.3d 1271, 1292-1293 (91h Cir. 2000)( where plaintiff did not include legal theory in complaint and did not 
identify the theory at any time prior to summary judgment, she could not rely on the theory for the first time in 
summary judgment.) 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT. 
Even if not waived, Appellant's challenges to the underlying proceedings and the district 
, 
court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondent are without merit. 
The first glaring issue with Appellant's appeal is the fact that he never actually filed any 
opposition to Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Rather, Appellant merely filed a 
Declaration which, as the district court noted, 14 failed to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure be~ause it was not sworn to under penalty of perjury as set forth in LC. § 9-1406. 
(R.Adden 050-064.) Further, the district court noted that where both Appellant and Defendant 
Kerr were proceeding pro se and neither were licensed attorneys, they could not argue on each 
other's behalf. (R.Adden 113.) Thus, where Appellant did not join in the opposition materials 
filed by Defendant Kerr, and Kerr could not otherwise represent Appellant's interests, it was as if 
. Appellant made no opposition at all, meaning that as a matter of law Appellant failed to present 
any evidence to create an issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. 
(R.Adden 102.) 
The second glaring issue is the fact that even if his declaration were considered valid, it 
did not create any issue of material fact to withstand Respondent's Summary Judgment motion. 
Specifically, Appellant's declaration implicitly admitted the existence of the subject loan and 
Nationstar's right to enforce its terms. (R.Adden 060-061.) And nowhere in Appellant's 
declaration was there any claim or evidence submitted that the payment obligations under the 
Note and Deed of Trust were not in default. (R.Adden 061-064.) In fact, nowhere in any of the 
14 R.Adden 113. 
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opposition materials, including those submitted by Defendant Kerr was there any evidence or 
statements contesting the subject Note and Deed of Trust, and the underlying default. (R.Adden 
035-099.) The district court even noted the same lack of evidence in its decision granting 
summary judgment as follows: 
In his unverified Declaration, Douglas admits that Nationstar is in possession of 
the Loan. Kerr testifies that he owns the Property with Douglas and that 
Nationstar possesses the mortgage on the Property. 
According to Nationstar' s evidence, no payments have been made on the Note 
since March of 2011. Neither Douglas nor Kerr offer any evidence to contradict 
Nationstar's evidence: they offer no evidence or argument that payments have 
been made on or after March of 2011 under the terms of the Note or the Trust 
Deed. Thus, Douglas is in breach of his contract (the Note and Trust Deed), 
which is now in the possession of Nationstar. Thus, Nationstar has the right, 
under the Trust Deed, to foreclose on the Property. 
(R.Adden 110.) The present appeal similarly lacks any evidence or the citation to any evidence 
which would create an issue of material fact with respect to the validity of the Note, Deed of 
Trust, or default. 
Ultimately, the record shows that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Respondent based upon the undisputed evidence before it which showed that Respondent 
was beneficiary under a Deed of Trust encumbering the Property and entitled to foreclose due to a 
default in the monthly payment obligations. Similarly, all subsequent orders that were issued in 
order to effectuate the district court's summary judgment ruling were similarly valid. 15 
15 On appeal, Appellant also complains of insufficient service of process; however, Appellant never properly 
challenged service of process in the proceedings below, such that the issue is now waived on appeal. See Michalk v. 
Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 587 (2009)(noting that "a litigant may not remain silent as to a claimed 
error and later raise objections for the first time on appeal.") 
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THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S ATTEMPTS TO 
CLAIM THE PROPERTY AS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. 
This Court should decline to review appellant's challenge to the district court's denial of 
his claim( s) of exemption where he has presented an incomplete record on appeal and failed to 
support his position with propositions oflaw, authority or argument. Specifically, appellant failed 
to include in the record on appeal his claims of exemption, the Motions to strike his claims of 
exemption filed on October 22, 2015 and on February 10, 2016, or the transcripts of either 
hearing wherein the district court determined the claims of exemption improper. 
Under Idaho law, "it is the appellant's burden to produce a record demonstrating error, if 
'a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court will presume that the absent 
portion supports the findings of the trial court." Trotter v. BONY, 152 Idaho 842, 848 (Idaho 
2012); citing to State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009). Such a 
presumption is in accord with the long standing principle that this Court does not presume error 
"and thus throw the onus on the respondent of establishing its correctness." Poole v. Davis, 153 
Idaho 604, 288 P.3d 821, (Idaho 2012); citing to Goodman v. Minear Afining & Milling Co., 1 
Idaho 131, 134 (1867). Rather, 
Rather, Defendant Kerr raised arguments about the sufficiency of service of process on Appellant. In addressing 
Defendant Kerr's argument challenging the sufficiency of service of process, the district court correctly noted that 
"Kerr, who is not licensed to practice law in the state ofidaho, cannot argue on [Appellant's] behalf." (R.Adden 113.) 
Moreover, any challenges to the sufficiency of service of process are clearly barred by I.R.C.P. 12(g)(l) which 
provides that "a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of 
process is waived unless it is made by motion prior to filing a responsive pleading ... " Accordingly, where Appellant 
filed his Answer in this matter, he waived any objection to the sufficiency of service of process. Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Engineering, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 100 (2009). 
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Id. 
"[a]ll intendments must be favor of sustaining the judgments of courts of 
original jurisdiction, and to disturb such judgment, it is not sufficient that error 
may have intervened, but it must be affirmatively shown by the record." Id. 
(quotation omitted). More recently, we held that an appellant bears the burden of 
provid1ng a record that is sufficient " to substantiate his or her claims on appeal." 
Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 249, 254 P.3d 1238, 1245 
(2011) (quoting W Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Kickers, Inc., 137 Idaho 305, 306, 48 P.3d 
634, 635 (2002)). 
In addition: 
The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to support its contentions "with 
citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied 
upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Thus, it is "well settled" that an issue on appeal will not be 
considered if it is "not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument." 
Bowles v. Pro lndiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). Even 
where an issue is "explicitly set forth in the party's brief' as one of the bases for 
appeal, if it is" only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent 
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." Dawson v. 
Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010) 
(citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 
450, 456 (2003)). 
Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). 
With the foregoing in mind, Appellant's failure to provide the Court with the complete 
record on appeal pertaining to his claims of exemption and the district court denial of both 
requires that this court presume that the absent portion supports the findings of the trial court. 
Such a presumption, coupled with appellant's lack of authority supporting his claim that the 
district court erred makes clear that the district court's determination should not be disturbed. 
Even if such a presumption did not exist, Idaho law clearly shows that Appellant's 
attempts to claim the Property as exempt from execution were meritless. Specifically: 
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It is well recognized that a debtor's right to exempt property from the claims of 
creditors is not a common law right but is dependent upon constitutional or 
statutory allowance. 31 AM.JUR.2d, Exemptions, § 2 (1989). Thus, the general 
rule is that assets are not exempt from the claims of creditors unless specifically 
exempted by statute. Id. Furthermore, a debtor claiming an exemption generally 
must prove that his claim comes within the exemption provisions. Id., § 367. 
Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 950, 908 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Here, Appellant attempted to claim the Property as exempt from execution because he 
claimed a homestead exemption in the Property; however, Appellant's claims of exemption were 
stricken. First, as established by the Verified Complaint in this matter, Appellant transferred all 
of his interest in the Property to Defendant Kerr via a Quitclaim Deed. (R. at 9, ,i 3.) 
Accordingly, he was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption in a Property that he no longer 
had an ownership interest in. Second, even if Appellant had a right to claim a homestead 
exemption, under LC. § 55-1005, such an exemption does not supersede a foreclosure sale in 
satisfaction of a mmigage or deed of trust. See I.C. § 55-1005(3)-( 4). 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has waived the right to challenge the district court's 
denial of his claim(s) of exemption by failing to have provided the Court with a complete record 
on appeal and even if he had, Idaho law is clear that Appellant's attempt to claim a homestead 
exemption was meritless. Accordingly, the district court's rulings were appropriate. 
V. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
Respondent requests costs and attorney fees against the Appellant pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121, 12-123, and I.A.R. 11.2 on the grounds that it is the prevailing party in this matter and 
appellant has brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See 
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Lower Payette Ditch Co., v. Harvey, I Idaho 291 (2011). Here, Appellant has merely asked 
this court to second-guess the district court's decision granting summary judgment without 
providing the Court with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
he is relying upon. See PHH v. Nick,rson, __ Idaho __ (2016). Rather, Appellant's brief is 
replete with the same baseless conspiracy theories and slanderous accusations that were made 
before the district court and which have no place in these legal proceedings, are not grounded in 
fact, warranted by existing law, and are being made for an improper purpose including 
harassment, unnecessary delay, and needless increase in the cost oflitigation. 16 See I.AR. 11.2. 
Moreover, the award of attorney fees is appropriate pursuant to the terms of the Note and 
Deed of Trust which Appellant admits to signing and which Respondent sought to enforce 
through its judicial foreclosure action. Specifically, Uniform Covenant number 14 of the Deed of 
Trust provides that the "Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection 
with Borrower's default, for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights 
under this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, propertyinspection 
and valuation fees ... " (R. at 24.) Similarly, Section 7(E) of the subject promissory note provides 
"if the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as described above, the Note 
Holder will have the right to be paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this 
Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses include, for example, 
reasonable attorneys' fees." (R. at 31.) 
16 In fact as of the date of this brief, both Appellant as well as Defendant Kerr have filed another Complaint against 
the Respondent as well as other Defendants that have been previously named in their prior suits. The case was filed 
in the Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, Case No. CV OC 2016-2713, entitled David Douglas, Teny Lee 
Kerr v. Nationstar lvfortgage LLC et. al. 
- 17 -
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the district court's properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Respondent and properly denied Appellant's claim(s) of exemption. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1 2 w1s ~ to ?rd7ISB #7766 t ){CO Legal,J:'..,J2. 
V 300 Main Street, Suite 150 
Boise, ID 83702 
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